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Abstract
This article addresses the link between political knowledge and populist attitudes in the United States (US) in comparative
perspective. At the beginning of the new decade, populism in the US is associated with support for the Republican party
and Donald Trump in particular, and that is how I address it here. Using secondary data from a number of related studies,
we find that, overall, support for Trump is not only negatively related to political knowledge, but also to other factors that
make his supporters unaware of their being misinformed. This is because, more than for others, partisan cues serve them
as a basis for their factual beliefs about political actors and events and assessments of the beliefs of others. While political
knowledge has long been comparatively low in the US, as I show in the early part of the article, the relationship between
misinformation and populism (i.e., support for Trump) is seen as a new and especially worrisome element. In the conclud-
ing section I address what, if anything, could be done to address this situation.
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1. Introduction
In addressing the relationship between low political
knowledge and the emergence of populist attitudes, I be-
gin by comparing the political knowledge of Americans to
that of people in comparable countries, bringing to bear
data based on responses to political knowledge ques-
tions in cross-national surveys. By first breaking the re-
sults down by generation, I find a trendwhereby political
knowledge is becoming more dependent on education,
and that this is especially true of the United States (US).
The resulting challenge is that of civic literacy: An appar-
ently increasing proportion of voters cannot be counted
upon to have the political knowledge needed to act as
competent citizens.
I go on to address the link between civic literacy and
support for Trump and the Republicans in the US today,
with its rigid two-party system. Using secondary data
from a number of related studies, we find that, over-
all, support for Trump is not only negatively related to
political knowledge, but also to other factors that make
his supporters unaware of their being misinformed. This,
I contend, is a new element, and linked especially to me-
dia use. The informational deficits, in turn, make Trump
supporters especially susceptible to populist emotional
appeals relying on “false news” that exploit their anxi-
eties. What unites populists these days is that they iden-
tify with the interests of the native born, seeking to keep
outsiders out of the country, mobilizing against “elites”
who side with the outsiders against the “real” people
of the country. While in most democratic countries pop-
ulists have formed new parties, in the context of the rigid
American two-party system, they have largely succeeded
at taking over the Republican party, mobilizing a suffi-
cient number of registered Republicans to deny renom-
ination to insufficiently loyal legislators.
I have been working in the area of comparative polit-
ical knowledge for at least two decades. Emerging from
this literature is a consensus over the generally low level
of political literacy or political competence in democratic
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countries. Overall, since it was seen as a manifestation
of low political interest and attentiveness, low political
knowledge has not been regarded as a threat to democ-
racy. The bulk of respondents found in the research to
lack basic political knowledge were understood to be
politically passive, even when it came to voting. It was
implicitly assumed that when circumstances warranted
their participation, they would become more attentive
and thus sufficiently informed. A corollary of this assump-
tion was that they would seek the needed information
through communications media that could be counted
on to adequately provide the needed facts. The media
could be counted on to provide sufficiently objective
facts as long as the right to a free press and free expres-
sion were not threatened.
While it was acknowledged that there would be a
group that rejected the premises of liberal democracy
based on systematic misinformation, this phenomenon
was not given attention in the literature on political
knowledge since it was taken for granted that, except in
periods of great instability like the 1930s, the workings
of liberal democracy would keep such a group to a politi-
cally ineffective minority.
These assumptions made their way into our method-
ology. Representative samples of the population were
to be given political knowledge tests, allowing us to
compare different groups (by age, gender, region, edu-
cational attainment, as well as nationality, taking into
account cultural differences). Specifically, it meant that
wrong or “don’t know” answers treated as were equiva-
lent, since the former were basically a matter of a guess-
work. In other words, to be uniformed or misinformed,
in the end, amounted to the same thing.
The recent emergence of populist parties in demo-
cratic countries forces us to question these assumptions,
somethingwe are just beginning to do. As I have followed
developments in Trump’s America in particular, I am com-
ing to the realization that we can no longer count on a
large number of politically misinformed Americans to be
open to becoming informed. The literature has not yet
caught up with these developments, however. I could
find only one research article investigating the distinc-
tion between uninformed and misinformed, and it uses
European data. In it, according to van Kessel Sajuria, and
van Hauwaert (2020):
Recent research suggests that populist party support-
ers are not necessarily unsophisticated protest vot-
ers. This leads us to question the still popular as-
sumption that these individuals are politically unin-
formed. Simultaneously, given the current political
andmedia climate and debates about ‘fake news,’ this
article asks to what extent misinformation, i.e., the
possession of erroneous political information, stimu-
lates populist party support. Survey data from nine
European democracies are used to assess to what
extent populist party supporters differ from abstain-
ers and non-populist party supporters in terms of
their political information and misinformation. It is
found…that political misinformation relates positively
to support for right-wing populist parties. The findings
provide a first empirical and comparative contribution
to recent debates that seek to connect misinforma-
tion and political behaviour.
In the rest of this article I take an approach based on this
distinction. A great deal has been written about modern
liberal democracy, stressing majoritarian decision mak-
ing, respect for the rights of minorities, and freedom of
expression. Yet, in the context of what is happening to-
day, one dimension is missing, namely the capacity to
resolve disagreement through appeals to objective facts.
Experts and commentators have taken for granted, as the
well-known expression put it, “you can have your own
opinion, but not your own facts.” I return to this distinc-
tion and its relationship to populist attitudes after first
outlining what we know of comparative political knowl-
edge in democratic countries.
2. The Political Knowledge of Americans in
Comparative Perspective
An early signal of acute differences1 among devel-
oped democracies emerged from the International Adult
Literacy Survey (IALS). This highly sophisticated cognitive-
proficiency test, developed jointly by Statistics Canada
and the OECD, sought to assess the extent to which peo-
ple over 16 years of age in each country possess the kind
of literacy needed to be effective citizens in today’sworld.
The study tested the level of comprehension of three
types of written materials: 1) prose literacy—the abil-
ity to understand and use information from texts such
as editorials, news stories, poems, and fiction; 2) docu-
ment literacy—the ability to locate and use information
from documents such as job applications, payroll forms,
transportation schedules, maps, tables, and graphs; and
3) quantitative literacy—the ability to perform arith-
metic functions such as balancing a checkbook, calculat-
ing a tip, or completing an order form.
The specific literacy tasks designed for the IALS were
scaled by difficulty, divided into five broad literacy lev-
els. Level 1 indicates very low literacy skills, where the
individual may, for example, have difficulty identifying
the correct amount of medicine to give to a child based
on the information printed on the package. Figure 1 dis-
plays the average percentage scores for each country in
the three tests of those that scored in the lowest cate-
gory, which may be described as the “level of functional
illiteracy.” As we can see, those that have the fewest
falling in the functional illiteracy category turn out to be
the Nordics followed by the Netherlands and Germany.
Australia fits into a wide middle category along with
Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, and New Zealand, with
those at the bottom, the US, Britain, and Ireland, which
have the greatest number falling in the functional illiter-
acy level.
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Figure 1. Functional illiteracy level (IALS category 1 average).
Given that in modern societies information about
politics is in large part distributed in written form, we
expect to find a relationship between functional illiter-
acy and political knowledge, and thus a low level of po-
litical knowledge in the US. There is no shortage of doc-
umentation attesting to this (see e.g., Annenberg Public
Policy Center, 2014; Rauch & Wittes, 2017). The best
comparative political knowledge data is found in sur-
veys conducted for the Comparative Study of Electoral
Systems (CSES) based at the University of Michigan.
In the first three rounds, participating countries included
three political knowledge questions, designed to pro-
vide some overall comparability (the national research
teams were instructed to formulate the three questions
in such a manner as to have different levels of diffi-
culty, with one question being answered correctly by
2/3, another by 1/2, and the last by 1/3 of the re-
spondents). It was only the fourth wave, however, com-
prising surveys using the fourth module, that included
questions that were the same for all participating na-
tional surveys.
The data in Figure 2 is drawn from the combined
results to the questions posed in the first three waves.
Taken together, the responses in the 22 longstanding
democracies in the CSES give us a total of 102,783 respon-
dents. Figure 2 sets out the levels of political knowledge
in CSES countries that reported results for at least two
election surveys at least five years apart between 1996
and 2012. One conclusion emerging from the charts is
of generational decline: In all but one (Germany 2002)
of the 76 election surveys, young people were less politi-
cally knowledgeable than their elders.Moreover, inmost
countries the generational gap between young citizens
and everyone else was growing over time, though punc-
tuated by fluctuations due to the changing content, and
thus difficulty of the questions. Figure 3 combines the
data in Figure 2, setting out the average difference be-
tween the two age groups for all the surveys carried out
in each period. As we can see, the CSES data fits neatly
into 5-year intervals for the four waves. Because each pe-
riod contains the results from many different countries,
the effect of the fluctuations based on question difficulty
is effectively canceled out. Thus,we see a steady increase
in the generation gap, rising from about a quarter of a
question to almost half.
Overall, for the decades leading up to about 2012, a
clear relationship between declining political knowledge
and the arrival of what is termed the Internet Generation
(Milner, 2010) has been established. In order to compare
countries’ level of political knowledge per se, and not just
generational differences, we need to use the more re-
cent wave 4 data (up to and including 2016), when the
same political knowledge questions (see Supplementary
File, Appendix 2) were posed in each country. The ques-
tions in module 4 were based on recent facts, while
those in the earlier modules were a mix of facts about
institutions as well as recent and historical facts, which
would explain the less apparent generational difference.
Unfortunately, while the results found their way into sev-
eral research studies, the more comprehensive research
projects based on planned longitudinal use of the data
had to be abandoned when the questions were not in-
cluded in the subsequent CSES waves. Thus, there is no
data for elections after that date. In the Supplementary
File Appendix 1, the results are broken down by ques-
tion. Overall, with the exception of the question on un-
employment levels, amatter of acute concern to younger
respondents, older respondents are still more informed
than younger ones in most countries, though the picture
is cloudier than in earlier years.
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Figure 2. Difference in political knowledge: Between 18 to 25-year-olds and 26 to 65-year-olds.
The data represented in Figure 4 suggest that the key
differences are now cross-national. This becomes clearer
in Figure 5 where we combine the CSES data in Figure 4
into simple bar graphs setting out thus the average num-
ber of correct answers for all respondents at the times of
elections in each country. We can see that, overall, the
differences in literacy, which were identified in the IALS
surveys and visualized in Figure 1, are reproduced to a cer-
tain degree here. Among developed countries, on aver-
age, the highest scores are those inWestern Europe, next
come the English-speaking countries (excluding the US),
then those inAsia. They are followedby Eastern European
countries and, finally, developing countries. The US is the
clearest outlier with levels closer to the latter.
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Figure 3. Average difference in political knowledge between 26–65 and 18–25-year-olds.
A glance at the charts suggests that it is the countries
lower in civic literacy that, other things being equal, are
more vulnerable to the emergence of populist parties.
A clear exception is Greece, but other research suggests
that civic literacy is high in Greece since citizens need to
know something about politics in order to conduct or-
dinary business given the way the system operates. Of
course, another factor linked to the emergence of pop-
ulist parties and attitudes is geopolitical, in Greece and
Austria in particular, in the form of an awareness of vul-
nerability to uncontrolled migration.
The data also reflects a relationship to which I have
drawn attention inmy comparative analysis, namely that
between civic literacy and what I have termed the sus-
tainable welfare state (see Milner, 2010). Recently, as
Sitaraman (2019) argues, as inequality rises with the re-
treat from the welfare state in many countries, to still
find meaning somewhere in their lives, people retreat to
tribalism and identity groups, with civic associations re-
placed by religious, ethnic, or other cultural affiliations:
When taken to an extreme, social fracturing into
identity groups can be used to divide people and
prevent the creation of a shared civic identity. Self-
government requires uniting through our commonal-
ities and aspiring to achieve a shared future. When
individuals fall back onto clans, tribes, and us-versus-
them identities, the political community gets frag-
mented. It becomes harder for people to see each
other as part of that same shared future. Demagogues
rely on this fracturing to inflame racial, nationalist,
and religious antagonism,which only further fuels the
divisions within society.
Here I look specifically at themicro-relationship between
populism as currently finds expression in politics (i.e.,
support for Trump and the Republicans) in the low civic-
literacy US. Would-be populist leaders undermine politi-
cal institutions, questioning their legitimacy, for example
in Donald Trump’s false claims about widespread elec-
toral fraud. Populist discourse rejects nuanced political
arguments in favor of conspiracy-laden attacks that re-
ject the political legitimacy of one’s opponent. It tends
to encourage politics based on fear and resentment
rather than informed policy debate. Populist political ac-
tors often seek to mobilize exclusionary collective identi-
ties, appealing to ethno-nationalism. It is not a coherent
worldview but a dynamic framing strategy, analytically
separable from the political ideologies it expresses (see
Bonikowski, 2017).
The Trump phenomenon fits this conception of pop-
ulism, which is in fact not an “ism,” like socialism or fas-
cism, and fits nowhere on the standard left–right scale.
That’s because it has no underlying programmatic con-
tent, except, in the current context, keeping outsiders
out of the country and replacing their elitist sponsors in
politics and themediawith true patriots. It is understand-
able why populism has increasingly come to resonate
with voters who are experiencing frustrations associated
with rapid social change.
3. Populism and Political Knowledge in the US
There is no shortage of interest in populist develop-
ments currently. Here is an excerpt from the call for pa-
pers to the September 2019 American Political Science
Association meeting sent out early that year, a call which
drew scores of papers, something inconceivable at simi-
lar meetings only a few years earlier:
No recent political development has been more strik-
ing than the rise to power of self-identified pop-
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Figure 4. Difference in political knowledge by country from CSES Wave 4.
ulist movements around the globe, whose main uni-
fying trait is their claim to champion “the people”
against entrenched selfish “elites.” These movements
display differences that have sparked debates over
which, if any, should be called “populist”; how they
compare with past “populisms”; and what “pop-
ulism” is. The current partisans, often labeled pop-
ulist, have more often been on the right than the
left, including anti-immigrant, anti-globalization, ar-
dently nationalist parties such as Fidesz in Hungary;
the Law and Justice Party in Poland; and the Trump
Republicans in the United States. (American Political
Science Association, 2018)
To better understand this phenomenon, we can start
from a feeling of dissatisfaction with life generally, which
has been found to translate into the above identified atti-
tudes. In the case of Brexit, Alabrese, Becker, Fetzer, and
Novy (2018) using a sample of around 13,000 respon-
dents found a strongly significant association between
life satisfaction and support for leave, those who were
dissatisfiedwith life overall were around 2.5%more likely
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Figure 5. Average of correct answers in CSES Wave 4.
to answer yes to the question of whether the United
Kingdom should leave the European Union. This is true
both at the individual-level and at the aggregate local-
authority level, where the percentage of people dissat-
isfied predicts the leave vote.
Turning the US, using data from Gallup surveys of
US residents on various aspects of their subjective well-
being, Herrin et al. (2018) find a correlation between
subjective well-being and Trump voting. Placing counties
into 6 categories based on the percentage point electoral
shift from 2012 to 2016, they find that the percentage
of people placing themselves near the bottom in subjec-
tive well-being, both currently and in five years’ time,
is significantly associated with larger swings towards
the Republican Party. In counties where the Romney to
Trump swing was smaller than—10%, only 3.4% of peo-
ple were of low life satisfaction (0–4 on the 0–10 scale).
But in strong Trump voting areas (where the swing was
greater than 10%) this more than doubles to 7.1%.
Life satisfaction, we know, correlates with political
participation, both of which are positively linked to edu-
cation. According to Flavin and Keane (2011), thosemore
satisfied with life are likely to vote and participate in the
political process at a magnitude that rivals the effect of
education. Nate Silver, in his “538” assessment on of the
2016 election result, pointed out that Hilary Clinton won
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the 50 best educatedUS counties, and Trump the 50 least
educated (Silver, 2017). In the context, thus, of a negative
relationship between populism and both life satisfaction
and education, it is reasonable to expect to find that pop-
ulist attitudes correlatewith lowpolitical knowledge (see
also Stanley, 2008).
In part, the informational deficits that make these
voters especially susceptible to emotional populist ap-
peals simply reflect the quality of information they re-
ceive which exploit these anxieties. Trump supporters,
we know, more frequently rely on information media
that are most likely to provide false information that con-
firms their biases. In an analysis of millions of American
news stories Benkler, Faris, and Roberts (2018) conclude
that, unlike most news outlets that seek to adhere to
facts and run corrections of false reports, conservative
media are more concerned with confirming their audi-
ence’s biases, fearing angry reactions to exposures of
falsehoods from core viewers. As Jane Mayer (2019)
noted, on Fox News when falsehoods are exposed, core
viewers often react angrily, noting that after Shepard
Smith, the Fox News anchor, contradicted Trump’s scare-
mongering about immigrants viewers lashed out at him
on social media.
While we have no systematic data linking Trump sup-
port with political ignorance, there is no shortage of
suggestive partial data. For example, according to Kurt
Andersen (2017), when asked: “Do you believe that a
secretive power elite with a globalist agenda is conspir-
ing to eventually rule the world through an authoritarian
world government?” 34% of Republican voters said yes.
Poundstone (2016) reported on the results of several
quizzes. He first asked a sample of 404 adults whether
dinosaurs lived at the same time as humans. 25% of
Trump supporters agreed, but only 8% of those who had
voted for Clinton. Then he asked them three questions
getting at basic political knowledge: to identify Vladimir
Putin, the majority party in Congress, and the official
who nominates Supreme Court justices. Those who dis-
approved of Trump averaged 2.45 correct answers (out
of three), while his supporters averaged 2.21. The scores
for Clinton, 2.28 and 2.55, were reversed. He cites a sur-
vey showing much greater support for a US–Mexico bor-
der wall by those with low scores on a set of 16 general
knowledge questions, including locating North Carolina
on a US map and knowing which came first, Judaism or
Christianity (Poundstone, 2016).
Related to this is an important contribution to this
discussion in a recent publication by Fording and Schram
(2017, p. 670) based on data from the American National
Election Studies 2016 pilot study which surveyed a na-
tionally representative sample of 1200 adults. The au-
thors conclude that the Trump campaign exploited a void
of facts and reasoning among:
Low information voters…that made them more vul-
nerable to relying on emotions about Mexican im-
migrants, Muslim refugees, and African American cit-
izens, as well as their disdain for the first African
American President, Barack Obama. As a result, these
Trump supporters were less in a position to want or
be able to question Trump’s…campaign of misstate-
ments, untruths, and lies. (Fording & Schram, 2017)
Two measures were combined to gage political knowl-
edge, one indirectly through “need for Cognition” (NFC),
the other directly of political knowledge. Those with
low NFC rely more on cognitive short cuts such as the
statements of celebrities on issues. Two questions, the
scores on which were combined, got at this dimension:
“Thinking is not my idea of fun”; and “I would rather do
something that requires little thought than something
that would challenge my thinking ability.” Of the sam-
ple, 50% were found to be low in NFC, 15% high. The
latter measure consisted of two questions: 1) Howmany
years is a senator’s term?; and 2) on which of these does
the government spend least—Foreign aid, Medicare,
National Defense, and Social Security? 46% got neither
question right; 33% got one right, and 22% got both right.
The two indicators correlated quite strongly: Only 7% of
those getting both right were also ranked as low in NFC.
Controlling for level of education, party identification,
(on a seven-point scale from strong Democrat to strong
Republican), ideology (on a seven-point scale from ex-
tremely liberal to extremely conservative,) family income,
gender and age, and limiting the sample to whites, the
authors tested the relationship of both measures to feel-
ings about Clinton and Trump. The result of subtracting
the score for Clinton from that for Trump (the thermome-
ter gap) correlated strongly with political knowledge and
NFC. Preference for Trump among those low in political
knowledge was 20% higher and for those low in NFC it
was 12%. Nothing similar had been found regarding Mitt
Romney and other recent Republican candidates.
Breaking down the results, the authors found that
almost 80% of the effect of political knowledge flowed
through six items, each significantly related to support
for Trump over Clinton: 1) belief that Obama is aMuslim;
2) belief that whites are losing jobs to minorities; 3) be-
lief that Muslims are violent; 4) support for immigra-
tion restrictions; 5) racial resentment against blacks; and
6) belief that the economy has worsened over the last
year. Belief in the false assertion that Obama is a Muslim
had the strongest relationship—three times that of the
worsening economy, and twice the effect of the other
four questions.
This is part of the explanation. But there appears to
be, I argue, a more profound development that was less
present before the age of Trump, something our stan-
dard analyses of the effects and causes of political knowl-
edge have not incorporated. Before Trump, low civic lit-
eracy in the US had no partisan hue. Now things have
changed. Anson (2018) surveyed 2,606 American adults
online as to their political knowledge. He found that
those who performed worse were more likely to overes-
timate their performance. Moreover:
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When I asked partisans to “grade” political knowledge
quizzes filled out by fictional members of the other
party, low-skilled respondents gave out scores that
reflected party biases much more than actual knowl-
edge….More often than not, thismeans that partisans
will think of themselves as far more politically knowl-
edgeable than an out-partisan, even when that per-
son is extremely politically knowledgeable. (Anson,
2018, p. 1173)
This was more the case among Republicans than
Democrats, the former using partisan cues to judge
peers’ political knowledge to a greater extent confirming,
Anson noted, the findings of an emerging literature on
“asymmetric polarization” (Anson, 2018). To put it sim-
ply, the bulk of those identifying themselves as partisan
Republicans, which by 2020 are effectively almost all sup-
porters of Trump, are not only unaware of their being
politically misinformed, but dismiss efforts to bring out
the actual facts as politically motivated. Understandably,
thus, when the facts do come out, the effect, as the polls
continue to show, is negligible.
Barber and Pope (2019) carried out online surveys
of almost 1600 respondents who completed a politi-
cal knowledge quiz, which asked five questions: the
number of years served by a Senator, as well as the
name of the current Secretary of Energy, from four pos-
sibilities; which party is more conservative on the is-
sue of healthcare; which currently controls the House
of Representatives; and on which of four different pro-
grams the Federal government spends the least? They
found evidence that Republicans use partisan cues to
judge peers’ political knowledge to a greater extent than
do Democrats, coinciding with the actual polarization in
the American electorate:
We find that low-knowledge respondents, strong
Republicans, Trump-approving respondents, and self-
described conservatives are the most likely to behave
like party loyalists by accepting the Trump cue—in ei-
ther a liberal or conservative direction. These results
suggest that there are a large number of party loyal-
ists in the United States [whose]…claims to being a
self-defined conservative are suspect, and that group
loyalty is the stronger motivator of opinion than are
any ideological principles. (Barber & Pope, 2019)
Indeed, there is an emerging literature that begins
to assess these phenomena, using concepts like cult
(Heffernan, 2020), as well as tribalism (see Rauch &
Wittes, 2017).
4. Institutional Arrangements and a Media
Environment Favouring Trumpian Populism
The negative portrayal of Trump in the mainstream
media though accurate, has, if anything, bolstered
Trump supporters in their views: The more strongly his
statements—however distant from the facts—stick it to
the elitist liberals, i.e., the “Democrats,” the more fer-
vent, apparently, is their support. In this war, on the
other side are the “lamestream” news organizations, the
“enemies of the people” (an expression notably first
used by Vladimir Lenin after coming to power in the
decree of 28 November 1917 declaring the opposing
Constitutional Democratic Party to be filled with ene-
mies of the people who are to be arrested immediately).
Politically, thus, the priority for Trump is to mobilize
his hard-core base, which, at this writing, remains large
enough to keep almost all Republican legislators from
straying, fearing defeat in the primaries more that in the
general election, and verbal if not physical violence.
In this context, as noted at the outset, Trump support-
ers are not uninformed but misinformed. While factual
information can have an effect on the views of the for-
mer, this is not the casewith the latter. Trump supporters
who are ignorant by the standards of our political knowl-
edge tests do not see themselves that way. Hence his ap-
proval rate is unaffected by the revelation that, as of this
writing, he has uttered 16,500 false or misleading state-
ments since taking office, according to the factcheckers.
To take one example, the following was reported in The
Washington Post:
President Trump held his longest campaign rally to
date on Dec. 18, just as the House was voting to im-
peach him. We measured how much of what Trump
said was accurate and how much was false. That
meant going through Trump’s often-dizzying remarks
line-by-line, nearly 12,000 words in total….Of the
179 statements we identified, 67 percent were false,
mostly false or devoid of evidence. That’s 120 fact-
free claims.
At the December rally in Michigan, Trump falsely
claimed he won the state’s “man of the year” award.
He falsely claimed to have set military spending
records. He claimed—again, falsely—that 401(k) re-
tirement accounts have gained up to 90 percent
in value during his presidency. He falsely claimed
Michigan hadmore auto industry jobs. He inflated the
attendance at his rally and made up stories about sev-
eral Democratic rivals. He took credit formajor legisla-
tion and economic growth trends and NATO spending
that came well before he took office. (“Anatomy of a
Trump rally,” 2020)
It is in the context of intense as well as asymmetric po-
larization that this distinction has become significant. As
Rauch (2019) argues, “emotional identification with a
partisan team is driving ideology, more than the other
way around,” that, in the US today, “party equals tribe.”
He cites Pew Research Center (2018) data showing that
more than three-quarters of respondents in both parties
concur that Republican andDemocratic voters can’t even
agree on basic facts, and that, compared to 1994, the
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share of Republicans with very unfavorable opinions of
the Democratic Party went from 17% to 43% in 2014,
while the share of Democratswith very negative opinions
of the Republican Party went from 16% to 38%. Among
them, the vast majority say the opposing party’s policies
represent a threat to the nation’s well-being:
What we fear, we tend also to hate….Partisans are
not so much rallying for a cause or party they believe
in as banding together to fight a collective enemy—
psychologically and politically a very different kind of
proposition….Fans of opposing sports teams perceive
different events in close calls. Fans of opposing po-
litical parties perceive different facts and take differ-
ent policy views depending on which party lines up
on which side. Presenting people with facts that chal-
lenge an identity—or group-defining opinion does not
work; instead of changing their minds, they will often
reject the facts and double downon their false beliefs.
Although the result was to reverse Republican ortho-
doxy on everything from entitlement spending and
trade protectionism to global alliances and the FBI,
partisans felt no psychological inconsistency or lurch,
because, as a result of their ideological somersaults,
they continued to be aligned with the same in-group
and opposed to the same out-group. (Rauch, 2019)
Older, white, less educated males in blue states over-
whelmingly fit the above characterization. Not only does
their social milieu reinforce these sentiments, but so do
the social and electronic media from where they get in-
formation. They have Fox News and other pro-Trump
electronic media sources like Breitbart, and national
and local phone-in hosts in stations owned by Sinclair,
Trinity broadcasting network, and Nexstar. According to
Woolley and Joseff (2020):
Emerging technologies, including synthetic media, vir-
tual and augmented reality, and biometric-powered
mass surveillance have the potential to worsen the
disinformation crisis in a number of ways. However,
it is not only the sophistication of these technologies
that poses the greatest challenge, but the interaction
with the demand-side drivers….News consumers who
are heavily invested in false political narratives are of-
ten quite knowledgeable about (and skeptical toward)
independent media.
With the latest communications technology, recognition
of a voice or picture is no assurance of authenticity. With
the development of synthetic media and “deepfakes,”
every digital communication channel, audio, video, or
even text, can be imperceptibly subverted. To illustrate
this, we can cite as just one example of what is appar-
ently happening regularly the following from a report in
The New York Times about a “video of Democratic presi-
dential candidate Joe Biden that was selectively edited
to falsely suggest he made racist remarks during a re-
cent speech made the rounds Thursday on social media,
raking in more than a million views on one tweet alone”
(Corasaniti, 2020). Also:
In the edited clip,whichwas less than 20 seconds long,
Biden says, “Our culture is not imported from some
African nation or some Asian nation.” Social media
users paired the videowith comments like “It’s almost
like Joe Biden is a racist….The clip was taken from ABC
News coverage of Biden speaking for more than an
hour in Derry, New Hampshire, on Dec. 30, 2019. A re-
view of the full video shows that Biden was comment-
ing on changing the culture around violence against
women. In discussing the difficulty victims face re-
porting sexual assault on college campuses, he said,
“Folks, this is about changing the culture, our culture,
our culture, it’s not imported from some African na-
tion or some Asian nation. It is our English jurispru-
dential culture, our European culture that says it is
all right.”…The video spread rapidly on social media,
amplified bymany right-wing verified users on Twitter,
including reporters at conservative news outlets, the
former speaker of theMissouri House and Republican
strategists, according to data compiled by Vinesight, a
company that detects disinformation on social media.
(Corasaniti, 2020)
Finally, American institutional arrangements exacerbate
this situation, enshrining the two-party system, giving
extra political weight to the blue regions far from the
metropolitan centers and most prone to the false news
syndrome.We turn to this aspect next before addressing
what, if anything could be done to meet the challenge.
5. Institutions, Policies, and Political Knowledge
5.1. Civic and Adult Education and the Media
The challenge is significant. It is not a matter of convinc-
ing Trump supporters that his policies conflict with theirs,
since his defying Republican orthodoxy on everything
from entitlement spending and protectionism to global
alliances and the FBI caused no discomfort for his parti-
sans. Clearly adult education, via themedia or otherwise,
is a dead end. This need not be the case as far as youth fo-
cused civic education is concerned, since it is offered an
age where its recipients are not likely to have yet come
to accept misinformation as knowledge. But, in the con-
text of emerging communications technology, what we
know so far is not reassuring.
With regard to young people, we would expect that
a key component of political knowledge is the qual-
ity and availability of civic education. I tested the ef-
fects of civic education in a survey in 2006 with the
Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning
and Engagement (CIRCLE), at the University of Maryland.
Its Civic and Political Health Survey updated a previ-
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ous youth survey (Keeter, Zukin, Andolina, & Jenkins,
2002), telephone interviews were conducted with a na-
tionally representative sample of 1,765 Americans, of
which 1,209 were aged 15 to 25 posing three political
knowledge questions. For this second round, five ques-
tions were added, so that the resulting questionnaires al-
lowed for 8 possible correct answers (the list of questions
can be found in Appendix 3 of the Supplementary File).
Political knowledge was found to be low, especially
among young people. Out of a possible score of 7, the
mean of correct answers was 2.12 for young Americans
as compared to 2.89 for those 26-plus. The results of the
responses to the specific questions were the most glar-
ing, with 55% of young Americans unable to name one
permanent member of the UN Security Council (i.e., in-
cluding the US), and 56% unable to identify citizens as
the category of people having the right to vote.
The CIRCLE survey then asked the student respon-
dents whether their classes required them to keep up
with politics or government, either by reading a newspa-
per, watching TV, or going onto the Internet. The effect of
such a reported requirement did not quite attain signif-
icance, but the reported frequency that history, govern-
ment, or social studies teachers encouraged students to
discuss political and social issues over which people have
different opinions did significantly correlatewith political
knowledge (see Milner, 2007).
In observing civic education programs in a number of
countries (seeMilner, 2010), I have noted the importance
of designing and targeting civic education programs to
bring political knowledge to individuals low in the requi-
site home and community resources, supplemented by
government-supported programs affecting the supply of
political knowledge in such areas as political party financ-
ing, information dissemination, voter registration, and
mock parliaments. Moreover, since these young people
are frequently potential dropouts, civic education is most
effective when offered at a time when they are still in
school but close to voting age, and in a formmost likely to
appeal to them. Our knowledge in this area is, however,
limited by the absence of even minimal systematic com-
parative data on basic aspects of civic education such as
the hours of teaching time involved andwhether it is com-
pulsory and required for graduation.What we do know is
primarily based on American studies, which suggest that
civic education in the US is markedly skewed toward con-
stitutional history and voluntary community participa-
tion, avoiding addressing partisan issues and, thus, polit-
ical misinformation (see Milner, 2010). It is hard to imag-
ine, in the context of populist and anti-populist polariza-
tion, how educational authorities could do otherwise.
This, it would seem, is insufficient to prepare young
Americans for the systematic misinformation around
them. Lowering the voting age to 16, as proposed by
Franklin (2004), who argues that because the period in
a young person’s life after leaving the parental home typ-
ically at age 18–20 is unsettled, and thus a bad time to de-
velop habits related to voting. However, in the context of
an information world comprised of Internet-based sub-
cultures consisting of chat rooms, blogs and the like,
one wonders if one can really count upon adolescents
getting information from family discussions of the news
over supper.
Lowering the voting age, combined with increasing
the years of compulsory education could place young
potential voters in a position to benefit by combining
civics classes with complementary activities, such as the
mock elections that are carried out in many countries
among high school students, by organizations like Kids
Voting USA, which arranges for teachers in most states
to help students gather information about candidates
and issues, so that, on election day, they cast their bal-
lots in special booths. Whether such simulations, like
the Minitinget in Norway (see Milner, 2010) would they
have an effect in the US today is an open question.
According to the National Center for Science education
(https://ncse.ngo/research), more than half of American
students are inaccurately taught about evolution and cli-
mate change.
5.2. Electoral Arrangements
An article by Grönlund and Milner (2006) placed coun-
tries’ electoral institutions on a continuumbased on how
close to proportionality was the number of seats won
by each party compared to the votes it received. The
method used was to quantify the dispersion of political
knowledge among educational attainment categories by
calculating the variation from the mean for each CSES
country of the average political knowledge score in the
group with the lowest level of education. We found that
overall, as party outcomes becomemore proportional to
popular support, political knowledge becomes less dis-
persed, less dependent on formal education.
Clues of a relationship between the electoral system
and the knowledge required to cast a meaningful can be
found in the literature focusing on the ideological repu-
tation, ideological coherence and historical consistency
of parties (Merolla, Stephenson, & Zechmeister, 2014).
Brader and Tucker (2012) found that party labels are
more effective in older, more stable systems, and Lau,
Patel, Fahmy, and Kaufman (2014) found that “ideologi-
cal distinctiveness” of the parties increases citizens’ abil-
ity to cast a correct vote. Turning to the US, we know that
a “positive” effect of the extreme polarization has led to
far greater “correct” votes (i.e., conservatives support-
ing Republicans and liberals voting Democratic). Given
the institutional arrangements, a rigid two-party system,
primaries, and the extra weight of smaller rural (typi-
cally older and white) states in the electoral college, and
the ability of states to set their own rules of eligibility,
the Trump supporters are assured of continuing to dom-
inate one of the two parties even after he is gone from
the scene.
There is little indication that this could change in
any fundamental way. Third parties have neither the re-
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sources nor incentive to mount a campaign to get on
the ballot state by state. The Supreme Court has refused
to step in in cases partisan redistricting, and changes
affecting the electoral college would require a constitu-
tional amendment, since there is no reason to believe
that the efforts in a handful of states to allocate electoral
college votes proportionally rather than winner-takes-all
will catch on.
6. Conclusion
Given the underlyingwider societal developments taking
place, we should not harbor any illusions. The growing
polarization in certain modern societies, including, and
especially, the US, between the growing metropolitan
regions and those left behind in smaller towns and ru-
ral areas is compounded by the digital revolution that
creates separate echo chambers through which relevant
information—and misinformation—is filtered. And we
know, for example, how this was used in highly sophis-
ticated targeted data by Cambridge Analytica and Russia,
which probably changed the outcome of the 2016 elec-
tion, and possibly the Brexit vote.
The challenge could not be greater. But so are the
stakes. In closing, the reader is referred to an impor-
tant new work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2019) which
draws the fine line between despotism and anarchy and
tells the story of how infrequently societies were able to
walk it for any lengthy period of time and how important
trust in the institutions now under attack from the pop-
ulists for maintaining prosperous, stable, well-governed,
law-abiding, democratic, and free societies.
A lot will depend on the emerging generations. One
thing we do know is that we need better and more
comprehensive comparative data related to the level of
and relationship between political misinformation and
populist attitudes especially among members of this
generation before we can hope to effectively address
the challenge.
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